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REGIONAL SPORTS NETWORKS,
COMPETITION, AND THE CONSUMER
DianaMoss*

I. INTRODUCTION

n an economy increasingly characterized by complex business
relationships, Regional Sports Networks (RSNs) are no
novelty. There are now about 40 such entities in the U.S., the
oldest of which is the Madison Square Garden Sports Network
(MSG). Launched in 1969, MSG bffers programming for the
New York Knicks (NBA), New York Rangers and Buffalo
Sabres (NHL), New York Liberty (WNBA), and New York Red
Bulls (MLS).1 Arguably, the centerpieces of the RSN industry in
the U.S. are the two large, rival families of RSNs controlled by
Comcast SportsNet (CSN) and Fox Sports Net (FSN)2 CSN
operates eight RSNs while FSN controls almost i8 networks that
offer sports programming for a variety of individual U.S. cities
and regions.
The prominent role of media in sports likely accounts for
the ownership interests of multi-channel video programming
distributors (MVPDs) in many RSNs. MVPDs include cable and
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) providers. RSNs are hugely
* Vice President and Senior Research Fellow, American Antitrust
Institute (dmoss@antitrustinstitute.org). Many thanks to those that provided
comments on earlier drafts, including Steve Ross, Roger Noll, Don Resnikoff,
and Albert Foer.
Little League Communications Division, New England Sports Network,
Madison Square Garden Network to Televise LLB New England,Mid-Atlantic
Region Tournament Games, Little League Online, April 14, 2008,
http://www.littleleague.org/medialnewsarchive/2oo8stories/New-England-Sp
ortsNetwork _MadisonSquareGardenNetwork toTeleviseLLBNew_
England__Mid-AtlanticRegion Tournament_G ames_-_April-14.htm.
2 See, e.g., Ronald Grover et al., Rumble in Regional Sports, Bus. WEEK,
November
22,
2004,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/o4_47b39o9I43mmzoi6.htm.
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profitable, with margins estimated at 30 to 40 percent and
average fees of $2 per subscriber, second only to the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network's (ESPN) fees
of $2.50 per subscriber.3 In the recent acquisition of Adelphia
cable assets by Time Warner and Comcast, Federal Trade
Commission Commissioners Leibowitz and Jones Harbor noted
that "RSN programming.. .is a unique product, of tremendous
value to a certain segment of consumers, and thus.access to it is
crucial to cable and satellite providers' ability to remain
competitive."
Comcast and Fox have aggressively pursued the
formation of RSNs around the country, often vying with each
other for control of key markets. For example, Fox has recently
ceded RSN markets in Chicago, the Bay Area, New England,
and New York to CSN and entered other markets in Southern
California, Arizona, Houston, Indiana, and Kansas. Both CSN
and FSN have purchased a number of formerly independent
RSNs. Strategic competition also appears to play a large role in
the RSN industry. For example, News Corporation, parent of
FSN West, purchased the Los Angeles Dodgers (MLB) in 1998
with the alleged purpose of discouraging Disney (which then
owned ESPN and the Anaheim Angels (MLB)) from launching
its own RSN-ESPN West.'
Competition between RSNs in bidding for team media
rights and in negotiating with MVPDs for distribution is often
quite fierce. A number of independent RSNs have been outbid
by the larger incumbents, CSN and FSN, in their attempts to
purchase the media rights to specific teams. The Grizzlies
Regional Sports Network, for example, was formed to carry the
programming for the Memphis Grizzlies (NBA) but folded before
its first scheduled game because the team re-signed with FSN
South.6 And the Victory Sports channel, owned by the Minnesota
Twins (MLB), collapsed in 2004 after less than six months on the
I Grover, supra note 2; see also Frank Ahrens, Area Baseball Network
Must Form Quickly, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A14.
4 Time Warner/Comcast/Adelphia, Statement of Commissioners Jon
Leibowitz and Pamela Jones Harbour (Consurring in Part, Dissenting in Part),
January 31, 2006, File No. 051-0151, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
itwadelphialeibowitzharbour.pdf.
closings/ftc/051o5
I See John Dempsey, Disney, Fox in NHL Faceoff, VARIETY, Aug. 6,
i998, available at http://www.variety.com/article/VRi I174792 ii.html?cate
goryid= 18&cs= i.
6 Grover, supra note 2.
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air because the Twins failed to negotiate deals with local area
cable or DBS distributors.7 Twins programming returned to the
local FSN network.
Vertical relationships involving sports-related multi-video
programming (MVP) link up the media rights holders (i.e., the
teams) with the. RSN, which purchases the rights to transmit the
events: The RSN then coordinates with and jointly markets the
programming to MVPDs who offer it in turn to subscribers in the
form of sports channels and other premium sports packages.
These relationships can range from ownership through merger or
acquisition, to contractual agreements with exclusive terms and
conditions, to simple buyer-seller relationships.
Partial ownership structures are common for RSNs. For
example, Comcast has a 20 percent ownership interest in
SportsNet Chicago (which replaced the defunct FSN Chicago),
along with Cubs (MLB) owner the Tribune Company (20 percent
share) and the White Sox (MLB) and Bulls (NBA) owner, Jerry
Reisendorf (40 percent share). The CSN Bay Area is jointly
owned by Comcast (45 percent), Fox (30 percent), and the San
Francisco Giants (25 percent). Other RSNs are joint ventures
that do not include MVPD ownership. The New England Sports
Network (NESN), for example, is a joint venture between the
Boston Bruins (NHL) and Red Sox (MLB). Also consider the
controversial Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN), which is coowned by MLB rivals the Baltimore Orioles and Washington
Nationals.'
RSNs raise threshold competition policy issues because of
the unique structure of the markets involved. Rivalry at one or
more levels in the chain of vertical integration involving sports
teams, RSNs, and MVPDs is often limited, if not nonexistent.
Under these circumstances, changes in control that create or
strengthen vertically-integrated content/distribution platforms
warrant a rigorous level of scrutiny by antitrust and regulatory
See Mike Reynolds & R. Thomas Umstead, Twins Rights Victory for
Fox, MULTICHANNEL

NEWS,

May

17,

2004, available at http://www.

allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-regional-local/62599
86-i.html.
' See, e.g., Baseball, TV and the Antitrust Exemption, WASH. TIMES,
August 22, 2005, at A12. ("In an era when the potential on-the-field fortunes of
baseball teams rise or collapse with the size of the television contracts they can
negotiate off the field, the Nationals have suffered a major financial setback
whose relative and absolute dimensions will almost certainly worsen over time
unless the outrageous, back-stabbing deal is reversed.").
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agencies.
This article sets forth the various scenarios for vertical
arrangements involving RSNs that potentially raise competitive
and consumer problems.. Central to the analysis are the unique
issues surrounding the demand for sports programming and
market definition surrounding those markets. This article also
notes that while there are no antitrust exemptions involving
relationships between professional league sports and MVPDs,
other sports-related immunities might be argued to apply to
RSNs.
Fact situations in RSN markets can vary substantially, so
there are no simple answers to the foregoing questions. But it is
possible to frame the major questions they raise for competition
policy. The article proceeds in Section II with some brief
background material on markets for sports MVP. Section III
then discusses potential horizontal and vertical competitive issues
that may arise in such markets. Section IV considers important
questions that are specific to markets for sports MVP that can
bear on antitrust analysis. Set forth in section V is a discussion of
the applicability of certain sports-related immunities to RSNs
and MVPDs. The article concludes with a discussion of the
implications that competitive issues surrounding sports MVP
markets have on antitrust and regulatory policy.
MARKETS FOR SPORTS

MVP

There are a number of possible scenarios involving
markets for local sports programming. Two scenarios, however,
are most likely to be encountered. One scenario is a single,
unintegrated RSN in the upstream media rights market and
competing cable and/or satellite providers in the downstream
MVPD market (Figure i). A second scenario (Figure 2) involves
multiple,
unintegrated upstream
RSNs and
competing
downstream MVPDs. Figures i and 2 indicate the relationship
between the RSN and MVPDs in the downstream market and
the individual teams and the RSN in the upstream market. In
either case, an unintegrated RSN markets programming to both
the local cable and DBS providers, although it could have an
exclusive arrangement to market programming to only one
MVPD.9 Also note that the figures assume that consumers choose
I Federal Communications Commission (FCC) program access rules
prohibit exclusivity between integrated cable providers and RSNs. Integrated
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one mode of MVP distribution, but nothing precludes sports
enthusiasts from subscribing to both cable and DBS services, if
they are available.
FIGURE I:

SINGLE
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As for the relationships in the upstream market, Figure i
indicates that an RSN purchases the media rights for one or more
local professional teams. This relationship best describes, for
example, CSN Chicago, which handles programming for the
White Sox, Cubs, Bears (NFL), Bulls (NBA), Blackhawks
(NHL), and Fire (MLS). The FSN West and FSN Prime Ticket
serve the Southern California market, collectively covering a vast
array of teams, including: the Clippers (NBA), Lakers (NBA),
Angels (MLB), Dodgers (MLB), Ducks (NHL), Sparks (WNBA),
Kings (NHL), Chivas (MLS), and Galaxy (MLS).
Figure 2 shows the scenario involving multiple RSNs that
market programming for different combinations of teams or
sports in the same geographic area.1° For example, the Rocky
Mountain region hosts both the Altitude Sports and
Entertainment Network (ASE), which carries programming for
the Nuggets (NBA), Avalanche (NHL), Rapids (MLS), and
entities are required to charge other MVPDs reasonable and nondiscriminatory fees for programming. These rules were extended for five years
in September 2007. See, e.g., John Eggerton, NCTA Pans Program-Access
Rules in FCC Filing, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA65 I 7249.html.
,0 Some RSNs also cover local collegiate and minor league teams.
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Mammoth (NLL). Rival CSN Rocky Mountain carries the
Broncos (NFL), Rockies (MLB), and Mammoth.
FIGURE 2:

RIVAL RSNs AND MVPDs

The scenario shown in Figure 2 prompts a number of
questions. One is the extent to which consumers have access to
both cable and DBS modes of MVPD, since different RSN
programming can be carried on rival MVPD providers. The
ability of consumers to switch MVPD providers in response to
programming prices, content, and quality is an important feature
in markets with multiple RSNs. DBS continues to be slightly less
available in certain markets that are served by cable. In 2002 the
Federal Communications Commission estimated that 88 percent
of cable subscribers also had access to DBS, up by 12 percent
from 200.11 Cable penetration rates, however, have declined
over time-falling to a 17 year low of about 61 percent in

n This issue has arisen in controversial mergers of cable or DBS providers
See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert and James Tarliff, Sky Wars: The Attempted
Merger of EchoStar and DirecTV, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 120 (J. E.
Kwoka & L. J. White, eds. 5th ed. 2008) (citing F.C.C., REPORT ON CABLE
INDUSTRY PRICES, FCC 03-136, released July 3, 2003, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-o3-I 3 6Ai .pdf).
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Most of this share was given up to DBS.
and 2005, for example, DBS subscribership

2007.12
2004

increased by almost 13 percent.13 In 2005, DBS accounted for
about 28 percent of all U.S. MVP subscriptions. 4

Another question is the extent of competition in the
upstream market for sports media rights, which arguably
influences the number of RSNs that potentially operate in any
given region. Table i lists U.S. RSNs that carry programming for
professional sports and the regions they cover as of the writing of
this article. There are a total of 15 RSNs nationwide, serving 28
regional markets. Seven markets contain two or more RSNs,
including: New York City (three), Kansas City (two), the MidAtlantic region (two), Ohio (three), New England (two), the
Rocky Mountain region (two), and the Northwest (two). The
remaining 2 1 markets contain only one RSN. is

12 Steve Donohue, Cable Penetration Hits i7-Year Low, Multichannel
News, Mar. I9, 2007, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6425963.html.
1' F.C.C., ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE STATUS OF COMPETITION IN
THE MARKET FOR THE DELIVERY OF VIDEO PROGRAMMING, 12TH ANNUAL

REPORT, released March 3, 2006, at 37, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/

edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-o6-iiAi.pdf
[hereinafter 12TH ANNUAL
REPORT]. Note that a more recent report has not yet been released by the
FCC. See, e.g., Barbara Esbin & Adam Thierer, Where is the FCC's Annual
Video Competition Report?, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Apr. ii, 2008,
available at http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.I iwhereisFCCvid
compreport.html.
14 12TH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13.
" Table i does not report RSNs that carry collegiate sports or arena
football programming. For the purposes of distinguishing regions by distinct
geographic area, Northern and Southern California are divided into two
regions. RSNs serving the Portland and Seattle areas (Northwest) are
combined, as are those offering programming for teams based in Ohio.
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(RSNs) IN THE U.S.

TABLE i: REGIONAL SPORTS NETWORKS
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Key to Abbreviations:
FSN=Fox Sports Net; CSN=Comcast Sports Net; MSG=Madison Square
Garden Network; NESN=New England Sports Network; YESN=Yankees
Entertainment and Sports Network; ASEN=Altitude Sports and Entertainment;
Sports Network; MS=Metro
4 SD=Channel 4 San Diego; MASN=Mid-Atlantic
47;
Sports; COX=Cox Sports; STO=SportsTime Ohio; C47=Catch
26;
Sports
Warner
TWS26=Time
Network;
Sports
CoSN=Columbus
SNY=SportsNet New York.
t Includes CSN West and CSN Bay Area Networks
Includes FSN West and FSN Prime Ticket
Note: ESPN is not included in the table since it is a national sports network
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Potential "overlaps" in RSN programming are greater in
large cities that can support more than one same-sport team or
that contain a large enough number of professional sports teams
to support multiple RSNs. For example, New York City hosts
both the Yankees Entertainment and Sports Network (YESN)
that covers the Yankees (MLB) and SportsNet New York (SNY),
which carries the rival Mets. The Mid-Atlantic region also hosts
multiple RSNs. The Mid-Atlantic Sports Network (MASN)
carries programming for rival MLB teams the Orioles and
Nationals as well as the Ravens (NFL). The CSN Mid-Atlantic
carries the Redskins (NFL), Wizards (NBA), Capital (NHL),
D.C. United (MLS), Bayhawks (NLL), and Mystics (WNBA).
Because the demand for sports programming is driven in
large part by fan loyalty, however, it is not clear to what extent
RSN packages actually compete, despite the apparent choices in
programming that are evident in many of the markets served by
multiple RSNs.
COMPETITIVE ISSUES INVOLVING

RSNs AND MVPDs

Mergers or contractual agreements involving RSNs and
MVPDs can fundamentally alter the incentives and abilities of
market participants, potentially affecting prices, output, choice,
and innovation in both programming and distribution. While the
focus here is primarily on vertical arrangements, it is helpful to
review the horizontal issues that can arise in RSN and MVPD
markets. 6 For example, does the aggregation, coordination, and
joint marketing function performed by a single RSN eliminate
competition in the upstream media rights market? If it does, then
the RSN could restrict programming output and raise prices to
MVPDs. The answer'to this query, of course, largely depends on
whether individual team programming competes for the
viewership of local fans or, in the alternative, whether the RSN
performs a valuable economic integration function for a series of
individual team "monopolies," each with no good substitutes.
16The competitive effects of consolidation or agreements on competition
and consumers are evaluated under the "no-harm" (to competition) standard
employed by the antitrust agencies under Section 7 of the Clayton Act (i5
U.S.C. § i8); Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (as amended, i5
U.S.C. § 45); and the broader public interest standard applied by the FCC in
exercising its statutory authority under the Communications Act (410 U.S.C. §
3 Io(d)).
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Mergers of either MVPDs or RSNs also have horizontal
effects. In Figure 2, for example, the merger of two independent
RSNs could produce a more powerful entity with a greater ability
to make demands on downstream MVPDs.
This includes
placement on an MVPD's standard tier and/or a per customer
charge that would be passed on to subscribers. The rumored
combination of the YESN and NESN in 2004 potentially raised
this issue." A merger of unintegrated local cable providers that
creates significant market share, on the other hand, might
enhance buyer market power. The likely competitive effects of
these scenarios depend on a variety of factors, including the
structure of upstream and downstream markets, the degree of
vertical integration, consumer preferences, and any relevant
efficiencies. The preponderance of vertical integration involving
RSNs (e.g., joint-ownership by teams and MVPDs), however,
bears strongly on competitive judgments involving horizontal
integration such as the merger of two cable companies.
Vertical integration or contractual arrangements that
mimic a merger between RSNs and MVPDs pose the classic
double-edged sword for competition and consumers-the
balancing of efficiencies against potentially restricted output,
higher prices, reduced choice, and less innovation resulting from
the exercise of market power.
There are three potential
categories of economies that might result from such integration.
One is lower transactions costs for the merged firm due, for
example, to: (i) eliminating price negotiations for certain services
and (2) avoiding the haggling between stakeholders about how to
divide the proceeds of sports media productions. A second source
of savings is investment in equipment that can be used in joint
production of sports and non-sports programming.
Finally,
integration can eliminate double margins (i.e., successive
markups) associated with imperfectly competitive up and
downstream markets.
At the same time, consolidation that creates a verticallyintegrated content/distribution platform or exclusive agreements
involving an unintegrated RSN and MVPD can have potentially
anticompetitive effects. 18
For example, consider a merger
17 See, e.g., Yanks, Red Sox in TV Merger?, CNN Money, Aug. 3, 2004,
http://money.cnn.com/2 0041o8/o3/newslmidcapslyesnesn/index.htm.
18 The United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission blocked the

take-over of the Manchester United football (soccer) club by Rupert
Murdoch's BSkyB-the monopoly supplier of premium sports programming.
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between the RSN and cable provider in Figure I. Such a
combination potentially creates the ability and incentive for the
firm to adversely affect market outcomes by foreclosing the rival
DBS supplier from access to RSN programming (i.e., input
foreclosure) or to engage in conduct that would otherwise raise its
rival's costs by charging more for programming or lowering the
quality of such programming in a way that could inhibit the
MVPD's ability to compete.' 9 A merger or exclusive agreement
between an RSN and DBS supplier in Figure 2 poses the
additional possibility that the merged entity could deny or
frustrate the rival RSN access to placing programming on its
MVP system (i.e., customer foreclosure).
The foregoing types of input and customer foreclosure or
raising rivals' costs strategies are typically considered in vertical
arrangements involving upstream input and downstream output
suppliers. 20 The integrated firm's ability to foreclose or raise
rivals' costs stems from the control of RSN programming.
Incentive turns on whether frustrating or denying access is a
profitable strategy. For example, the integrated or contractuallyrelated firm must offset the lost programming revenue from rival
MVPDs with a revenue gain from its own sales of sports
programming at supra-competitive prices. This cost/benefit
analysis depends on the structure (i.e., market shares and
concentration) in upstream and downstream markets.
Consider now a merger of the two cable providers (one
with an existing interest in an RSN) in Figure 3. Such a
combination might increase the firm's incentive to adversely
affect market outcomes. With a greater share of the downstream
MVPD market, the merged company might find it profitable to
deny or frustrate the rival DBS supplier's access to the
programming of its integrated RSN affiliate or otherwise raise its
See, e.g., Martin Cave and Robert W. Crandall, Sports Rights and the
Broadcast Industry, i i i THE EcON. J. 469 (2001) at F 4 -F26.
"9Note that FCC rules that require integrated cable providers to offer
programming on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms can be gamed by
setting a high price charged to competing MVPDs. But the same pricecharged by the cable provider to "itself--is effectively a transfer price and
arguably does not affect the ability of the firm to compete.
20 See, e.g., Michael H. Riordan and Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical
Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 5 13 (I994) and David

Waterman, Vertical Integration and Program Access in the Cable Television
Industry, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 5i (I994) at 517-20.
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costs, thus impairing the firm's ability to compete in the
downstream market.
Alternatively, the larger post-merger
MVPD might have more incentive to foreclose the competing
RSN from access to the merged company's MVPD as a customer.
Likewise, the merger of the two competing RSNs in
Figure 3 (one with an existing interest in a MVPD) could increase
the ability of the merged entity to adversely affect market
outcomes. With a control over all RSN programming in the
market, foreclosure of the rival MVPD is more viable.
FIGURE 3:
RIVALS

RSNs AND MULTIPLE, RIVAL MVPDs

The exclusionary conduct embodied in foreclosure is problematic
because it narrows the field of options for rivals in their
respective markets. Depending on the type of foreclosure, such
diminished competition can increase the prices at which RSN
programming is sold to MVPDs and/or those charged to
subscribers of MVP services.
Consumers' ability to switch to competing MVPDs to
avoid subscription price increases or degradation in
programming quality is a key factor in determining whether
mergers or exclusive agreements involving RSNs and MVPDs

LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 2 1: 1

can harm consumers. These issues have arisen in a number of
cases, including the Federal Communication Commission's
decision in Fox's proposed acquisition of DirecTV 21 and the
Federal Trade Commission's investigation into Comcast and
Time Warner
Cable's proposed acquisition of the cable assets of
22
Adelphia.

IMPORTANT FACTORS IN EVALUATING COMPETITIVE ISSUES

Competition analysis under both antitrust and regulatory
standards typically looks at a number of factors: market
definition and structure (i.e., market shares and concentration),
competitive effects, the role of entry, and merger-related
efficiencies. Two of these factors are likely to stand out in
assessing competitive outcomes in sports-related MVP-market
definition in upstream media rights and downstream MVPD
markets and the role of consumer-related efficiencies.
MARKET DEFINITION

Market definition is the first and often most important
step in antitrust analysis. A "relevant" market for antitrust
purposes is the smallest group of products (in a geographic area)
that consumers could switch to in order to avoid a price increase
by a "hypothetical" monopolist. Market definition therefore asks
what products consumers view as good substitutes. If consumers
can switch to other available products, then it would be harder
for any single seller or group of sellers to profitably increase
prices.23 Applied in the RSN context, the question of market
21 See F.C.C., General Motors Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp.,
Tranferors, and News Corp. Ltd., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and

Order,
FCC 03-330,
released
January
14,
2004,
available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-o3-33oAi .pdf.
22 See, e.g., posting of Shepard Mullin to Antitrust Law Blog, FCC
Antitrust
Highlights, http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/highlights-I53-fccantitrust-highlights.html (Aug. 7, 2005); David Lieberman, FCC Asked to Put
Limits on Deal for Adelphia, USA TODAY, July 24, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2oo-07-24-adelphia-usat-x.htm;
F.T.C., FTC's Competition Bureau Closes Investigation into Comcast, Time
Warner Cable and Adelphia Communications Transactions, January 31, 2006,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo6/oi/fyio6o9.htm.
23 See U.S. D.O.J. and F.T.C, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, S7 FR 41,552
(1992), revised, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (April 8, 1997), Section I,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm.
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definition centers on how MVPDs are likely to view
programming for different local teams marketed by an RSN.
For example, is programming for the local baseball team a
good substitute for local hockey? Is programming for one local
baseball team a viable substitute for a rival local baseball team,
as in the case of the Yankees and Mets in New York or the
Dodgers and Angels in Southern California? If not, then the
media rights for each team are effectively individual monopolies
and joint marketing would not eliminate competition.2 4
Alternatively, if programming for individual teams offered by an
RSN does compete for the viewership of local fans, joint
marketing through an RSN eliminates such competition and
could result in restricted or lower quality programming and
higher prices to MVPDs.
Decisions in a number of antitrust cases, including USFL
v. NFL, indicated that the most important sports constitute
separate markets." Under such circumstances, an RSN such as
CSN Chicago that coordinates the rights for multiple differentsports teams may not raise competitive concerns. However,
RSNs like MASN and FSN West that jointly market the rights of
the rival Orioles and Nationals and the Dodgers and Angels,
respectively, may be problematic.
In downstream markets, the relevant antitrust question is
how MVP subscribers view RSN products offered through
different MVPDs. For example, do consumers consider different
RSN channels and packages sold by local cable and satellite
providers to be effective substitutes? This may be the case in the
larger metropolitan areas that host the multiple RSNs shown in
Table i. And in what instances do sports channels compete with
other forms of non-sports premium programming?
In
downstream markets, the FTC has made both of the foregoing
determinations-i.e., that premium sports channels comprise a

Most RSNs provide coverage of local or sports teams within or near a
major metropolitan with strong fan loyalty and support. A local MVPD would
be unlikely to consider sports-related MVP offered by non-local RSNs a good
substitute.
24

2 See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d I335 (1988). For a more detailed

discussion, see Franklin M. Fisher, Christopher Maxwell, and Evan Sue
Schouten, Sports League Issues: The Relocation of the Los Angeles Rams to St.
Louis, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION AT 277 (J. E. Kwoka and L. J. White,
eds., 4 th ed. 2004).
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market and that premium pay television programming comprises
26
the relevant market.
Based on the foregoing, consolidation of RSNs in a
"premium sports channel" market could pose competitive
problems while under a broader market definition (e.g., all
premium pay programming), it would not. Market definition is,
and will likely continue to be a controversial part of competitive
analysis involving sports-related MVP, particularly with ongoing
changes in how sports programming is marketed, with larger
numbers of channels offered in basic packages and sports and
non-sports programming bundled together as part of premium
services.
CONSUMER ISSUES

Because of the intense popularity of and role of fan loyalty
in driving demand for sports programming, the competitive
analysis of sports-related MVP is likely to consider other factors
that could bear on enforcement decisions involving integration or
contractual relationships. First, MVP subscribers may place a
higher value on convenience and quality than they do on price.
This characteristic of consumer demand creates tensions for the
desirability of certain market structures that would be achieved
through mergers or agreements involving RSNs and MVPDs.
For example, fans might willingly pay a supracompetitive price
to avoid the service interruptions that could occur because of
disruptive bargaining. Such problems could arise between rival
RSNs over the media rights to individual or groups of teams or
27
between multiple RSNs and MVPDs in a geographic market.
Under the foregoing circumstances, arrangements or outcomes
that place local sports programming with a single RSN could
provide benefits to consumers.
26 European competition authorities have made similar findings. See, e.g.,

Office of Fair Trading, The Director General's Review of BSkyB's Position in
the Wholesale Pay TV Market, (1996), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/
sharedoftlreports/medialofts 79.pdf.
27 Due to asymmetries (i.e., imbalances) in information between
buyers
and sellers, establishing prices for programming is costly and bargaining can
be a disruptive process. One example of this is the negotiations between YESN
and Cablevision in NYC. See, e.g., Echostar's Dish Network is Lone Holdout
in Cablevision, YES Network Deal, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS, March 28,
2003, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/north-americalunited-statesnew-york/i 147329-I.html.
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Second, placing RSN's sports programming with an
MVPD in an exclusive arrangement could arguably allow the
firms to differentiate themselves from a competing sports
content/distribution (i.e., RSN/MVPD) platform in the market.
This type of "systems" competition could allow rival RSN/MVPD
platforms to compete more effectively.2 8 Both of these potential
pro-consumer scenarios involving vertical relationships between
RSNs and MVPDs should, however, be considered in light of the
fact-patterns in specific cases.
For example, horizontal
integration between MVPDs (as in the case of ComcastlTime
Warner/Adelphia), if superimposed on exclusive arrangements
between unintegrated RSNs and MVPDs may renew or intensify
the bargaining over the share of profits that are divided between
the various stakeholders. This increases the likelihood of service
disruptions that inconveniences fans and viewing audiences.
Multiple offerings between rival RSNs, each with
exclusive agreements with cable and DBS providers, could also
force consumers to invest in different or additional equipment
and pay for bundled packages that include redundant sports
programming. 9
The weight given to the foregoing considerations in
antitrust analysis will depend largely on the magnitude of
potential competitive harm raised by various transactions. More
competition in popular sports channels and packages offered
through RSNs is very much in the interest of MVPDs whogiven strong viewership for the team-specific programming that
is offered by different RSNs-would find ready customers.
Moreover, promoting competition at both the RSN and MVPD
levels is likely to ensure that prices are low, and that consumers
are afforded choice in sports-related programming.

See, e.g., Sports Programming and Cable Distribution: The
Comcast/Time Warner/Adelphia Transaction, December 7, 2oo6, Prepared
statement of Federal Trade Commission, (Presented by Michael Salinder,
Director, Bureau of Economics to Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/Po52IO3SportsProgrammingand
28

CableDistributionTestimonySenatei 2o62oo6.pdf.
29 At the same time, mergers or exclusive agreements could also harm
consumers by forcing them to purchase multiple and/or incompatible
hardware.
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APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS RELATING TO
PROFESSIONAL LEAGUE SPORTS

There are no specific antitrust exemptions involving
professional league sports and MVPDs. Nonetheless, another
source of controversy in the RSN debate may be whether
antitrust immunity afforded league sports in certain contexts
should apply to RSNs.3 ° For example, professional baseball has
the benefit of a court-created exemption which extends to
franchise relocations and other conduct that is the "business of
baseball."3
Arguments that the provisions of the Sports
Broadcasting Act (SBA) of I96I may exempt RSNs may also
surface in the debate. The SBA exempts from antitrust scrutiny
any league that "sells or transfers all or part of the (broadcast)
rights of the league's member clubs.""
While the applicability of the baseball exemption outside
the player market is still unresolved by the courts, it is likely that
the exemption would not easily be extended to the joint
marketing activities of RSNs. Several attempts to apply the
baseball exemption to media have failed.33 The exemption does
not cover arrangements that are designed to protect or increase
the profits of a particular team owner or when the controlling
entity (the RSN) is not a baseball team engaged in the business of

10 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV.
643 (1988). Ross argues that the single-entity argument is flawed as a matter of
economics because club-run leagues do not have a unity of economic purpose
and lack a residual claimant to organize the league and distribute the proceeds.
See also, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, IQ BELL J. OF ECON.
324 (1982) and Michael A. Flynn & Richard J. Gilbert, The Analysis of
Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures, iii THE EcON. J. 469 at 27
(2001).

31 See Federal Baseball Club vs. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); see
also Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 917 (I953) and Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
32 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
33 See, e.g., Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Association,
Inc., 659 F. Supp. IO9 (S.D. Tex. 1987). Here, a district court held that an
exclusive agreement between the Houston Astros and a radio station was not
exempt because the competition affected was with a rival broadcaster, not a
participant in the baseball industry.
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baseball. 4 Arguably, the joint marketing of rights through RSNs
is no more the business of baseball than is running a parking lot
adjacent to the stadium.
The broadcast exemption is also not easily extended to
RSNs. Here again, several attempts to expand coverage of the
SBA to MVPD have failed.3" The SBA deals with collective sales
of rights or joint contracting by a league, not to sales of
individual rights by local team owners or to the resale of rights by
a rights purchaser (e.g., an RSN). Moreover, major federal cases
have construed the applicability of the SBA to "sponsored
telecasting" to apply narrowly to over-the-air television
broadcasting. This means it would not affect negotiations with
cable or satellite providers by entities controlling the media
rights.
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST AND REGULATION

The foregoing analysis of competitive issues in sports
programming markets highlights two major policy issues. First,
MVPD markets have benefited by continued penetration of DBS.
But cable mergers that increase incentives to foreclose rival
MVPDs from affiliated RSN programming could quickly reverse
those gains. Competition will therefore benefit from continued
In
close monitoring and scrutiny of cable consolidation.
problematic cases, divestiture can reduce cable market power.
And regulatory policy initiatives and directives that promote the
continued penetration of DBS and compel carriage of
independent programming should be promoted.
Second, the lack of close substitutes created by fan loyalty
to particular local teams can have significant implications for
competition in MVPD markets. This unique feature of demand
for sports programming will affect whether joint marketing of
rights through RSNs creates competitive problems. It also will
affect outcomes of vertical relationships between MVPDs and
RSNs and mergers or either downstream MVPDS or upstream

" See Stephen F. Ross, The Baseball Antitrust Exemption Lives, But with
Criticism, in the Eleventh Circuit, American Antitrust Institute, May 28, 2003,
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/247.ashx.
11 In Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir.
1999), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the statute did not protect
the NFL's sale of games for satellite programming packages.
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RSNs in the presence of vertical arrangements.
Exclusive
agreements that foreclose competing MVPDs from access to RSN
programming could impose significant switching or duplication
costs on consumers who are forced to invest in multiple services
to get the programming they want.
The foregoing issue highlights the growing dichotomy
between cable-based and DBS-based MVPD systems. In this
case, maintenance of "systems competition" is heavily dependent
on robust upstream media rights and downstream MVPD
markets and open and unfettered MVPD access to local sports
programming.
Exclusive agreements or mergers that limit
MVPD access to programming undercut the benefits of growing,
head-to-head competition between cable and DBS. Vertical
relationships therefore require careful monitoring and (when
necessary) remedial conditions such as "open access" to
programming or divestiture. 6

36 See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposalforthe Antitrust Regulation
of ProfessionalSports, 79 B. U. L. REV. 889 (I999) at 954-55.

